


# POLITICIANS AND POACHERS

*The Political Economy  
of Wildlife Policy in Africa*

CLARK C. GIBSON



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mitigate against choosing this most desired policy.<sup>99</sup> The challenge for the policymaker/principal is to design decision-making rules within the bureaucracy so as to mitigate the problems of agency.

Although Kaunda may have favored strict enforcement, he relied on others to implement his preferences. As in any principal-agent situation, slippage occurred. Moreover, because the government and party officials on whom he relied would have had little reason to antagonize the electorate unnecessarily with vigorous enforcement, individuals would be likely to shirk as well. With hundreds of officials and staff scattered across the country responsible for the implementation of wildlife measures, it was next to impossible for Kaunda to monitor his agents' actions effectively.

Furthermore, Kaunda himself had reasons for not monitoring the implementation of wildlife policy more closely. First, he may have been unaware of or unalarmed by the level of poaching during the 1960s. Although the department reported some increase in illegal hunting, little international scrutiny of his wildlife policy existed. In fact, during this period Kaunda basked in the glow of the international recognition he received from establishing one of the largest systems of national parks in the world.<sup>100</sup> Second, Kaunda had other important concerns that crowded his political agenda at this time, such as the pace of development, the infighting among members of the party's executive, the diversification of Zambia's economy away from the mining sector, and his relationship with Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia. Without any domestic or international watchdog groups raising alarm, and with other concerns on his plate, Kaunda had less immediate motivation to invest political capital in monitoring the implementation of his wildlife policy. But as wide as the gap between his preferences and those of other officials was at this time, we will see it would grow vastly wider during the 1970s as the value of noncompliance increased.

#### WILDLIFE POLICY AND INDEPENDENCE POLITICS IN KENYA AND ZIMBABWE

The shared colonial origins of Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe's conservation policies created remarkably similar trajectories for their wildlife policies in their colonial and early independence periods. As in Zambia, independence leaders in Kenya and Zimbabwe used colonial wildlife policy to foment antigovernment sentiment and promised change once their parties came to power. And, as in Zambia, these promises went unfilled: Both Kenya and Zimbabwe kept and eventually extended the centralized and exclusionary wildlife policies established under white rule.

#### *Kenya*

During Kenya's colonial era, different sets of European authorities sought to preserve wildlife, but only as long as such pursuits did not hinder economic progress. In the early colonial period, the British East Africa Company (BEAC), like the BSAC in Zambia, created wildlife policies to control the ivory trade in Kenya, which had been long dominated by Arab traders. Both the hunting of elephants and the exportation of ivory were taxed and regulated.<sup>101</sup> When the British Foreign Office, which had prodded the BEAC to construct hunting quotas and license fees, took over Kenya's administration in 1895, it increased the number and type of regulations regarding the hunting of wildlife and established the country's first two game reserves. But the Foreign Office also adjusted its desire for conservation (a result of a growing conservation lobby in Britain) to fit the needs of white settlers who hunted for food, for profit, and for the protection of their domestic herds.<sup>102</sup> Hunting regulations were waived or amended for certain Europeans; game reserve boundaries were moved for the expansion of settler plantations.<sup>103</sup> And whereas the Game Department's creation in 1907 heralded an increased institutionalization of wildlife policy enforcement, most of these laws were ignored or easily evaded at the time.<sup>104</sup>

Like that of Zambia, one of Kenya Game Department's more important goals in the first half of the twentieth century was "animal control." Increasing numbers of European settlers and displaced Africans made reaching this goal illusory, as wider agricultural use of land meant more unwanted interactions with wildlife. Predators presented a significant obstacle to profitable farming and ranching.<sup>105</sup> Both European and African farmers adopted a strong antiwildlife position. The Game Department's position both to preserve and to control wildlife was thus difficult – especially as it funded itself on ivory and rhino horn sales in the 1920s and 1930s.<sup>106</sup>

Unlike in Zambia, however, the activities of a small domestic pro-conservation group in Kenya succeeded in generating a valuable tourism industry based on wildlife by the end of the 1950s. This group worked hard to overcome European farmers' antipathy toward wildlife (some still advocated the total elimination of wild animals) and to create alliances with the newly emerging international wildlife organizations (especially the Society for the Protection of the Fauna of the Empire, which was instrumental in paying for wildlife survey missions and lobbying activities).<sup>107</sup> These efforts resulted in colonial government support for the establishment of four national parks immediately after World War II. These national parks quickly drew large numbers of tourists: Whereas in 1946 only a few hundred international tourists visited Kenyan game

clines ranging from 1.6 to 2.1 percent for the same period.<sup>23</sup> Civil service workers, who represented approximately two-thirds of all formal sector employment, saw prices outrace government wage increases.<sup>24</sup>

Nearly all Zambians experienced income losses during this period; many individuals chose to supplement their income by hunting wildlife.

### *The Rise of the Wildlife Market*

Almost simultaneously with the collapse of Zambia's domestic economy, several international forces combined to foster a thriving trade in wildlife products. The flush of petrodollars from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) successful cartel and increasing incomes in some Asian countries stimulated demand for animal products, especially elephant ivory and rhinoceros horn.<sup>25</sup> Decreased incomes within Zambia also stimulated the domestic market in game meat. As a result, hunting activity in Zambia expanded quickly.

Ivory prices dramatically increased beginning in the early 1970s, multiplying sixfold by the late 1980s.<sup>26</sup> In response, hunters killed 75 percent of Zambia's elephants from the late 1960s through 1989.<sup>27</sup> In Zambia's Luangwa Valley alone, poachers shot an estimated 40 percent of the elephants from 1972 to 1979.<sup>28</sup> Others calculate a 60 percent fall for the period 1975-1986.<sup>29</sup> Whereas Zambia exported \$10 million worth of legally documented ivory from 1979 to 1988, nearly \$172.8 million left illegally.<sup>30</sup>

Strong international demand ignited a similar explosion in the prices, trade, and hunting for rhinoceros horn, except that the price for rhino horn exceeded that of ivory by a factor of 10.<sup>31</sup> Zambia experienced some of the heaviest rhino poaching on the continent.<sup>32</sup> Robinson estimates that 50,000 black rhinos lived in the Luangwa Valley in 1972.<sup>33</sup> The horn size of rhino noticeably decreased in 1978, and NPWS reduced the hunting quota for the species. By 1981, only two thousand rhino were left in the valley.<sup>34</sup> Tourists still saw rhino as late as early 1984, but probably fewer than a dozen, if any, were alive by 1992.<sup>35</sup>

Zambia's economic decline also stimulated a market for game meat, a significant part of many Zambians' diets, especially in rural areas.<sup>36</sup> After 1975 hunters seeking game meat killed species such as buffalo, hippopotamus, lechwe, warthog, and impala in unprecedented numbers.<sup>37</sup>

### *The Response of the National Parks and Wildlife Service*

The escalating relative value of wildlife products like ivory, rhino horn, and game meat made poaching an attractive activity to Zambians. After 1975, because of the enormous cuts in the budget of the National Parks

and Wildlife Service (NPWS), poaching became a less risky strategy as well. NPWS never possessed the manpower or the finances to enforce Zambia's wildlife laws; in the mid-1970s, it had drastically decreased resources.<sup>38</sup>

The NPWS budget suffered some of the largest reductions of any government department after the 1975 copper shock.<sup>39</sup> While the government's total expenditures fell an average of 6.7 percent from 1975 to 1978, NPWS's dropped by an average of 23 percent each year.<sup>40</sup> The NPWS portion of total government expenditure from 1970 to 1974 averaged nearly 0.5 percent. In the period 1975 to 1982, its share dropped to an average of 0.2 percent; it never subsequently exceeded 0.3 percent.

As discussed in the last chapter, NPWS had enjoyed strong budgetary support from the UNIP government in the period following independence. It had hired hundreds of general laborers for capital projects, operated a fleet of five aircraft, sponsored internationally renowned scientific research, and experimented with programs designed to demonstrate the possible economic returns of wildlife. Although department officers believed poaching continued after independence, they hoped that despite the "basic motives of human nature" and the incessant conflict between agriculture and wildlife, the department could bring most forms of poaching under control.<sup>41</sup> In 1973 the North Luangwa National Park, soon to be a favorite hunting ground of elephant poachers, contained the country's highest density of elephant.<sup>42</sup>

The collapse of copper prices and government revenues resulted in the withering of NPWS operations after 1975. In 1977 NPWS cut 30 percent of its general labor force and did not start any major capital projects. The department did not initiate any major scientific projects that year, mustering resources for just one animal count. Only the contributions of the Wildlife Conservation Society of Zambia, the safari companies, and the Honorary Rangers sustained antipoaching efforts. Without this support, the NPWS director believed, it would have been "impossible to deal with" the increased poaching.<sup>43</sup>

In 1978, the Ministry of Finance refused to release appropriated monies to the NPWS capital account, reducing this budget, already cut by 38 percent in real terms from the year before, a further 50 percent.<sup>44</sup> In response, the department suspended most of its capital projects.

Activities funded by the recurrent budget also deteriorated. The number of antipoaching patrols declined because NPWS could not pay the Civil Service Commission's mandated subsistence allowance for scouts on patrol.<sup>45</sup> Only one aircraft operated at this time, down from the five used in 1974, and its flying hours were almost eliminated. The department also suspended staff attendance at international conferences.

Interest groups and businesses stepped in to help fund NPWS. The Honorary Rangers, a newly formed nongovernmental organization called Save the Rhino Trust (SRT), and safari companies became important financiers of antipoaching operations. The contributions promised by SRT to the department augmented the official budget by nearly 14 percent.<sup>46</sup> Circuit Holdings, a subsidiary of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), supported NPWS patrols near the ZCCM-owned resorts at Kasaba Bay and Nkamba Bay.<sup>47</sup> But despite this injection of monies, the department continued its decline: Unable to maintain its only helicopter, NPWS returned it to the Wildlife Conservation Society of Zambia (WCSZ). Critically short of funds, the department eventually encouraged safari companies to provide it with vehicles in exchange for hunting concessions. In fact, NPWS wielded so little clout that when it finally received an allocation of eight vehicles, Zambian security forces confiscated four of them for their own use.<sup>48</sup>

Although reductions in expenditures affected all departmental activities, those requiring relatively more expensive items such as fuel, vehicles, firearms, and ammunition – the material heart of enforcement operations – were hardest hit.<sup>49</sup> Countries that successfully protect their wildlife spend approximately one hundred dollars per square kilometer on enforcement; some conservationists believe four hundred dollars per square kilometer is necessary to save rhino from poachers. In 1983, Zambia spent four dollars per square kilometer and had a field presence of about one poorly equipped scout for every 350 square kilometers of protected territory.<sup>50</sup>

The NPWS implemented new policies it hoped could meet the growing crisis without great financial cost. The NPWS directorate, for example, established a Prosecutions Unit within the department in 1979 to overcome the ineffective investigations and weak prosecution record of the Zambian police in matters concerning wildlife. Although this led to a few more convictions, the increase did little to affect the extent of hunting.

#### *The New Distribution of Wildlife's Benefits*

The heterogeneity of poachers in Zambia spread the benefits of wildlife resources widely. The increasing relative value of wildlife encouraged a wide cross section of Zambian citizens to participate in the market, including rural and urban residents, chiefs, business owners, police and military personnel, NPWS staff, and politicians.

Economic shocks and government policies greatly increased the incentives for rural residents to hunt. Government pricing policies resulted in declining returns from agriculture. Government had cut jobs and services

in the rural areas after the copper crash. With fewer opportunities to earn income, rural residents found that petty trade in game meat and the benefits of alliances with ivory and rhino horn poachers offered ways to augment a household's income.<sup>51</sup> Some villagers expanded their hunting, made easier by the decline of NPWS enforcement; others routinely covered up commercial poachers' activities in return for meat or consumer products like flour, sugar, salt, cooking oil, and cloth.

Chiefs in rural areas also increased their hunting activities and collaboration with poachers. The traditional rulers benefited from their residual power over resources in the area, power enhanced by a decline in wildlife policy enforcement. A chief often settled for little in exchange for his permission to hunt and the help of his assistants, sometimes just a case of beer and a leg of buffalo.<sup>52</sup>

Urban residents enjoyed the growing market for game meat. Government economic policies had discouraged or redirected a great deal of economic activity in urban areas: Currency controls hurt businesses producing for the export market, inflation induced investment in enterprises with short-term production cycles, and formal sector employment stagnated under government fiscal and monetary policy. The low costs of hunting and the strong demand for game meat in the cities, as well as ivory and rhino horn in the international market, made poaching a profitable response to Zambia's economic environment.<sup>53</sup> And it was relatively easy for someone in Lusaka to buy a hunting license from NPWS headquarters in Chilanga (a fifteen minute drive). Hunting quickly became a valuable addition to the portfolio of many urban-based business owners after 1975.<sup>54</sup>

Members of the Zambian military and police units, also suffering from income declines, possessed the weapons and authority to support a great deal of illegal hunting activity. A 1980 report by the Wildlife Conservation Society of Zambia found well-documented incidents of army personnel setting up roadblocks at game park entrances. Later, army vehicles drove away, laden with meat and tusks.<sup>55</sup> Even if not directly poaching, soldiers and police regularly allowed other Zambians to borrow, rent, or purchase their official weapons, transport, or ammunition.<sup>56</sup>

Some Zambian politicians also exploited wildlife resources. Politicians hunted for economic profit, sport, distribution of favors, and their own consumption of game meat. The evidence available suggests a pattern of political involvement: Officials made regular trips to their regions to hunt without licenses, ministers demanded licenses in excess of NPWS quotas, and district governors roamed game management areas in search of buffalo.<sup>57</sup> Politicians implicated for wildlife illegalities include a secretary general of UNIP, district governors, parliamentarians, ministers of state, provincial members of UNIP's Central Committee, party officials,

and members of the Office of the President. A member of the National Assembly told colleagues that when government officials visited to his constituency, it "turned into a hunting camp."<sup>58</sup>

Staff of the National Parks and Wildlife Service sat at the center of poaching controversies. Economic decline reduced scouts' incomes, and other perquisites of a government job – like housing – were sometimes never allocated. The government might pay salaries months late. NPWS budget cuts had reduced the number of hours spent by supervisory staff in the field. These difficulties resulted in an ineffective NPWS with little control over its own employees. Villagers, chiefs, other civil servants, safari hunters, government ministers, and conservationists all decried the quantity of illegal hunting done by NPWS scouts and the trafficking in illegal trophies by NPWS officers. The department carried out few actual arrests against its own staff from 1973 to 1983.<sup>59</sup>

#### THE POLITICS OF WILDLIFE IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC

International demand and domestic economic catastrophe helped create a strong market in wildlife products. A wide variety of Zambians benefited from the new market. Budget cuts had left the NPWS weak, disorganized, and unable to cope with escalating poaching activities.

Members of the UNIP government and the National Assembly knew about the alarming increases in illegal hunting; some even participated. Their political responses to this crisis were far different from those in the multiparty First Republic. The institutional incentives of the one-party state induced politicians to sabotage Kaunda's policies designed to resolve the upsurge in poaching.

##### *The Structure of Competition over Wildlife Policy*

While the demands of a stagnant economy absorbed most of the president's attention after 1973, Kaunda's strong support of wildlife conservation and his newly expanded political powers led him to pursue numerous strategies to curb the growing poaching crisis.

Despite his belief that businessmen from Senegal and Mali had instigated the serious poaching in Zambia, reports from newspapers and NPWS officers convinced Kaunda that many members of his own party and government participated in the wildlife market. In an effort to end their clandestine activities, he "talked a great deal about these issues" with members of the Central Committee, the cabinet, and the security forces. Eventually, he put a "blanket stop" on all hunting, legal or otherwise, by members of the Central Committee.<sup>60</sup>

The president's exasperation with the extent of illegal hunting grew to the point where he issued circulars in 1978 threatening to dismiss anyone in the civil service or the party who were caught poaching. Many politicians thought the policy was unconstitutional, but nobody initiated a legal challenge. Even NPWS officers disagreed with the circular, believing that the individuals accused would be able to win easily in court.<sup>61</sup>

Kaunda became increasingly disenchanted with the effectiveness of NPWS and sought various ways to circumvent the agency. Representatives of nongovernmental organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund and the Wildlife Conservation Society of Zambia as well as international donors had no difficulty in getting appointments with the president to talk over conservation projects at State House.<sup>62</sup> The president publicly supported the extensive efforts of Save the Rhino Trust (SRT), whose members supplied and directed intensive antipoaching operations near two national parks using NPWS scouts beginning in 1979.<sup>63</sup>

A significant result of this open-door policy was that conservationists persuaded Kaunda to back a policy that would establish a new government agency designed specifically to investigate wildlife-related offenses. Ministers, SRT staff, prominent conservationists, and safari operators met with the president several times in 1982 to discuss the design and powers of the new agency, suggesting that it follow the structure of the Special Investigative Team into Economy and Trade (SITET), a unit set up during the 1970s to investigate currency and trade between Zambian and Rhodesian companies and answerable only to President Kaunda.

Kaunda used his authority over state-owned industry to bypass the "cheaters" at NPWS, instructing Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) to get into the business of tourism and wildlife "because they are effective and get things done."<sup>64</sup> Kaunda's directive eventually led to a ZCCM-owned safari business, ZCCM-sponsored antipoaching patrols, and ZCCM purchase of tourist resorts at Nkamba and Kasaba bays. Using his constitutional powers to alter the boundaries of national parks, Kaunda even degazetted part of Sumbu National Park to facilitate ZCCM's development plans for Kasaba Bay.<sup>65</sup>

The president, as commander in chief of Zambia's armed forces, also directed the military to participate in two extensive antipoaching operations. The largest military intervention occurred in 1981, when hundreds of Zambian army troops, supported by dozens of military vehicles and three helicopters, made a wide sweep through villages in the Luangwa Valley to make arrests and confiscate weapons and wildlife products.<sup>66</sup>

Kaunda did not give up entirely on his own government's bureaucracy: In an effort to strengthen wildlife legislation and its enforcement, he appointed individuals with legal experience to head the Ministry of Lands and National Resources in the early 1980s. Fitzpatrick Chuula,

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President Kaunda pushed to install the party's own disciplinary rules as part of Parliament's Standing Order. Members, however, continued the practice of questioning government.<sup>91</sup> Sometimes, even front-benchers maligned government policy.<sup>92</sup>

Such public activity may not have influenced the average voter; it is unlikely that many citizens bothered reading the transcripts of parliamentary debates. Testimony about parliamentarians' behavior did, however, reach the ears of local party officials, who were now responsible for candidate selection and campaigns. These officials acted against MPs who failed to articulate and meet local needs: Local party officials ousted twelve incumbent MPs during the 1978 primaries.

The new political logic of the one-party state made wildlife a salient issue for parliamentarians. Wildlife laws restricted access to a wide cross section of people over most of Zambia. Of the Second Republic's 125 total constituencies, 27 included national parks, where hunting is prohibited. Forty-six had game management areas within their areas, where hunting is very restricted. Over half (64) of Zambia's constituencies included or abutted a national park or a game management area. People had always cared about access to wildlife; institutions now motivated them to direct their concerns to their elected representatives.<sup>93</sup>

As previously discussed, most Zambians, especially rural residents, detest wildlife laws. Citizens feel they possess a right to hunt and believe that foreign safari hunters and not "hunting for the pot" endangers wildlife populations. Villagers also express a strong dislike for NPWS staff who interfere with their hunting practices.<sup>94</sup> The collapse of Zambia's economy and its resultant impact on incomes exacerbated the demands of citizens for wildlife resources.

Parliamentarians visiting or campaigning in their constituencies faced numerous complaints regarding wildlife policy.<sup>95</sup> Villagers griped about the few and costly hunting licenses, overzealous wildlife scouts, and lack of alternative sources of protein in their regions.<sup>96</sup> Some rural citizens thought the drop in animal populations resulted from a movement of wildlife to national parks, and not poaching. (In fact, villagers demanded access to these fugitive animals as well.) Family members often pleaded the cases of relatives jailed for violating wildlife laws. Urban constituents protested the high prices for licenses and beef and urged parliamentarians to legalize the trade in game meat. Such complaints were not new.<sup>97</sup> But, as a result of one-party political institutions, these grievances meant more to members of the National Assembly, who now needed local support.<sup>98</sup>

In addition to constituents, parliamentarians felt pressure from the rural and urban elite who had taken advantage of the burgeoning wildlife market. Those individuals involved in commercial meat, rhino horn,

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or ivory enterprises could be valuable friends or powerful enemies. Even influential Zambians wanting to sport hunt without infringement made their case to their politicians. "Every (National Assembly) member had at least one friend" pressing for low penalties and greater access to wildlife.<sup>99</sup> Consequently, both constituency service and patronage politics conspired against wildlife conservation.

#### THE CASE OF THE 1982 AMENDMENT

The parliamentary debate over the 1982 Amendment to the National Parks and Wildlife Act offers strong support for the hypothesis that Zambian parliamentarians, acutely aware of their new economic and political institutional environment, acted to protect their political interests at the expense of the collective outcome of better wildlife conservation.

From 1975 to 1982 NPWS made three attempts to get the National Assembly to pass amendments to the National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1971 that would boost the punishments for poachers.<sup>100</sup> With President Kaunda's backing, one proposal finally made it to the National Assembly.

As described in Chapter 2, the 1971 Wildlife Act centralized authority over Zambia's wildlife resources.<sup>101</sup> The president enjoyed absolute ownership of wildlife on behalf of the citizens and could declare or void game management areas. The minister in whose portfolio NPWS fell could, among other powers, regulate hunting licenses and fees, prohibit the hunting of certain animals, and restrict certain activities (e.g., vehicle traffic, setting of fires, fishing) within national parks.<sup>102</sup> The director of national parks administered the day-to-day operations of NPWS and advised the minister on the legal changes NPWS staff thought necessary to improve wildlife conservation.

The minister of lands and natural resources used his powers to issue a number of statutory instruments during this period, covering subjects such as hunting licenses and fees, prohibitions from certain areas, and safari and camping fees. The minister could also influence hunting quotas, which were composed as an internal document of the ministry and the department.

But the crucial act of changing the penalties associated with violating wildlife laws required the National Assembly to pass a law. Mr. Mwananshiku, the minister of lands and natural resources, presented such a bill in August 1982, the only NPWS effort to stiffen poaching penalties that made it to the National Assembly.<sup>103</sup> Emphasizing how the party and its government supported wildlife conservation, and noting the rapid increase in illegal hunting and deplorable state of the underfunded yet

hard-working NPWS, Minister Mwananshiku outlined the plan of the National Parks and Wildlife Bill Amendment of 1982 to increase poaching punishments. At that time, Capital Law 316 stipulated that individuals convicted of poaching elephants and rhino could opt to pay a fine, and most did because the amount was insignificant; individuals caught hunting in national parks could pay a fine or face a maximum five years in prison. At the heart of the new bill were three clauses: Clause 6 proposed that anyone convicted of hunting, wounding, or molesting elephants or rhinos would be sentenced to jail for fifteen years without option of fine.<sup>104</sup> Clause 7 proposed that anyone caught hunting illegally in a national park be subject to a sentence of no longer than ten years in jail without option of fine. And Clause 9 was intended to force the court to confiscate all the weapons and trophies of the convicted.

A two-sided debate over the bill emerged. Front-benchers (ministers, ministers of state, and district governors), all dependent upon President Kaunda for their positions, asserted that the amendment would protect wildlife resources for future generations, help NPWS with its fight against poachers, save the animals necessary to spark a more lucrative tourism industry, and prevent the extinction of elephant and rhinoceros. In other words, those members who had been appointed as government officials supported a conservation view closely aligned with that of President Kaunda, but that ignored the interests of most rural and urban residents. Backbenchers, on the other hand, passionately condemned the amendment. If passed, the bill, which "must have been designed by expatriates," would "protect the animals at the expense of the people," "protect animals so that only people from developed countries can see them," turn Zambia from "man-centered to animal-centered," "prosecute traditional practices," and reduce Zambians to "subhuman beings."<sup>105</sup> Amazed at the avalanche of dissent, the speaker of the National Assembly exclaimed, "The whole House wants to speak!"<sup>106</sup>

Members of the National Assembly themselves recognized the political incentives that separated front-benchers and backbenchers.<sup>107</sup> The backbencher L. B. Hantuba alluded to the fact that the front bench district governors present should have been attending another meeting but had flown in to Lusaka "to come and defend the animals."<sup>108</sup> W. H. Banda launched a direct attack on the sympathies of Kaunda's appointees:

If the House is going to allow this law to pass in its present form, Sir, it will be the most unfair law to be adopted by this August House. I am appealing, Mr. Speaker, particularly to the Members of Parliament who are District Governors and Ministers of State, I know that they are ready for other promotions but they should not use this proposed Bill as a means of influencing the appointing authority for promotion.<sup>109</sup>

Members understood front-benchers' conflicting incentives.<sup>110</sup> Speaking out for the amendment might have pleased Kaunda, but hurt an individual's electoral chances. The best strategy for some was silence in the National Assembly, "quietly praying that the Bill is defeated."<sup>111</sup> Backbenchers exposed ministers who whispered that "once this Bill goes through Parliament, half" of their constituents "will die in prison."<sup>112</sup> Most Kaunda appointees chose neither to oppose nor to support the amendment during debate. Only six front-benchers spoke for the bill, less than a tenth of their total numbers in the National Assembly.

Backbenchers made clear the link between wildlife and elections in three ways. First, dissent focused primarily on the potential effects of the bill on constituents, not on the collective goods it might produce, such as conservation and tourism receipts. Parliamentarians expressed concern about "punishing those who put us in power," and felt the bill would "humiliate innocent people" as well as jeopardize citizens' access to wildlife.<sup>113</sup>

Second, backbenchers pointed to the shadow of the upcoming 1983 elections. W. H. Banda expressed concern about the effect of the 1981 military antipoaching operation in his area on elections: "Parliamentary elections are very near. Indeed this incident . . . early created dissension in Malambo Constituency and other areas. Some people even threatened not to take part in the elections and declared that animals would vote instead."<sup>114</sup> Harking back to the statements made by the ANC leader, Harry Nkumbula, against the original National Parks and Wildlife Bill, L. B. Hantuba claimed that political songs "have already been composed in various districts that this Government favors animals more than human beings."<sup>115</sup> Backbenchers felt that they needed to articulate to the government "the true feelings of the people of Zambia" because they had to contest "difficult" elections against "about six other opponents"; they worried about how to interpret the legislation before the House to voters.<sup>116</sup>

Third, dissenting parliamentarians highlighted the basic political fact that people – not animals – vote: "When the registration of voters was taking place, I did not hear of any animal being asked to go and register as a voter; I heard the campaigners ask only human beings. Maybe the animals were asked in a different language";<sup>117</sup> "I hope they (those who vote for the amendment) will have the strength to tell their people in their constituencies that they favor animals more than people";<sup>118</sup> "At no time did rhinoceros or elephants participate in the fight of our independence."<sup>119</sup> With an election on the horizon, parliamentarians feared the anger of voters if the bill augmenting the status quo wildlife law passed.

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opposed the UNIP government on a variety of issues, apparently enjoying the dangerous game of being contrary.<sup>132</sup>

The logit procedure and estimated probabilities generally support the theory that parliamentarians cared about wildlife policy as an electoral issue. Front-benchers, owing allegiance to President Kaunda for their positions within government, were less likely to speak against one of his favored pieces of legislation. The regional background did not matter much to those MPs who took a public stand against the 1982 amendment, because protected areas cover parts of all Zambia's provinces and were therefore of concern countrywide. More significant to the MP was how much of the constituency contained lands on which hunting was limited by the wildlife code, and how close the previous election returns had been. If MPs with a great deal of protected area who fought tough elections were much more likely to speak out against the bill, this indicates that Zambian voters cared about their access to wildlife, and that politicians were aware of the electorate's concerns.

### **POLICY RESPONSES TO THE POACHING IN KENYA AND ZIMBABWE**

#### *Kenya*

Kenya endured poaching on a scale similar to Zambia's in the 1970s and 1980s. Even with a significant proconservation lobby in Nairobi, and a profitable and growing tourism industry based on wildlife, the political institutions of Kenya's one-party state and an economic downturn increased wildlife's role as a source of patronage goods. The political equilibrium caused by these factors was powerful, and policy change resulted only from the outside pressure of donor organizations.

Although Kenya did not legally become a one-party state until 1982, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) enjoyed *de facto* one-party rule when their last opposition party was outlawed in 1969. As in Zambia, parliamentarians became tied more tightly to their constituents. Candidates seeking parliamentary seats needed the approval of local party members, who expected returns from their endorsement.<sup>133</sup> Successful candidates had to survive very competitive elections with up to fifteen individuals running per seat. Delivering benefits to constituents dictated whether an MP could expect to stay in office; incumbents failing to secure political pork lost elections regularly.<sup>134</sup>

By the time of his death in 1978, Jomo Kenyatta had successfully concentrated power in the office of the president and had used it to increase his political support. After 1968, KANU's rules required that the party nominate presidential candidates, meaning that Kenyatta – and

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his successor, Daniel arap Moi – ran unopposed in the general elections. The president chose his ministers and bureaucrats primarily on the grounds of loyalty rather than competence. He directly selected state officials at all levels of government, from the directors of parastatals to the country's forty nonurban district commissioners. And he expanded the number of those reliant upon the state: By 1971, the Kenyan government was the country's largest employer.<sup>135</sup>

Three important consequences emerged from these actions. First, alternate locations of political power, from local government to the parliament, were stripped of power.<sup>136</sup> By the late 1970s MPs in legislative session rarely even voted. Second, the frequent shuffling of civil servants led to low levels of expertise, and high levels of indifference and corruption. And third, the system depended on resources for distribution between patrons and clients.<sup>137</sup>

The economic downturn in Kenya in the 1970s and 1980s severely reduced the supply of these resources. Import substitution policies, the world oil crisis, poor agricultural performance, and inflation combined to squeeze the Kenyan economy: State and individual incomes declined quickly. State expenditures were cut severely. The president could no longer afford to purchase his popularity with government revenue.<sup>138</sup>

Given their lack of alternative resources and the increase in the value of certain wildlife products such as ivory and rhino horn, many Kenyan politicians turned to wildlife to help meet their need for patronage resources.<sup>139</sup> By the middle 1970s, bureaucrats, ministers, local and national politicians, as well as their friends and relatives, were profiteering in wildlife. Unlike President Kaunda, who had a strong conservation ethic, President Kenyatta had no such commitment. At one point, he even asked a cabinet minister to give an export permit for fifteen tons of ivory to his daughter. And Kenyatta's fourth wife was one of the principal ivory traders in the country.<sup>140</sup>

The officials responsible for animal conservation were also heavily involved in the illegal wildlife trade. Two assistant ministers responsible for wildlife management participated in ivory sales. Park wardens from Kenya's Wildlife Conservation and Management Department (WCMD) skimmed from national park gate fees (which were collected in foreign exchange), and game guards accounted for a third of all rhino kills. When a reform-minded wildlife officer tried to fire dozens of WCMD personnel for corrupt acts, most were reinstated by their political patrons.<sup>141</sup>

Kenyatta did not respond with the same effort as Zambia's President Kaunda to the poaching crisis. In fact, there was little reason to do anything. Party and government officials at every level enjoyed this new source of income in a time of economic difficulties. Communities living

munities still felt their land had been stolen from them to create national parks and wanted this land back. They hunted illegally. They helped outside poachers. And they elected district councillors to forward this message to the government.<sup>151</sup> National-level politicians also viewed the wildlife industry with distrust: Conservation groups were generally dominated by whites. Those who received the bulk of the monies from wildlife-related industries were white hunters, white lodge owners, and white owners of tourism businesses.<sup>152</sup> Black officials thought that commercial white farmers were using conservation provisions to prevent the state from acquiring "underutilized" lands for resettlement programs.<sup>153</sup>

The new single-member, first-past-the-post electoral system installed in 1985 seemed to have facilitated the same type of constituent-service opposition to conservation as the Zambian case. In a rare fight against a government-introduced bill, members of the Zimbabwean parliament condemned legislation designed to introduce new, more restrictive regulations on the snaring of wild animals. MPs claimed that it was just another attempt at increasing white commercial farmers' control over their lands, while "ignoring the food requirements of rural peasants."<sup>154</sup> The bill ultimately failed to pass.

Despite such signs of opposition by parliamentarians, the wildlife industry provided a great deal of foreign currency to Zimbabwe, had good backward and forward linkages to other segments of the economy, and was often more profitable on marginal lands than cattle ranching.<sup>155</sup> And the DNPWM was working to include the residents of communal areas in the decentralization of wildlife management.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored how Zambia's change from a multiparty to a one-party state and an exogenous economic shock affected the country's wildlife policy from 1972 to 1982, as the political institutions of the Second Republic altered the pattern of benefits accruing to politicians and shifted their subsequent choices. Unlike in the First Republic, individuals in the Second Republic had great incentive to battle Kaunda's preference for more extensive wildlife conservation policy. The result was a wildlife policy that, although unchanged *de jure*, created significantly different *de facto* outcomes: More individuals hunted more animals with less fear of being caught by NPWS.

This result defied President Kaunda, whose new powers within the one-party state were considerable. After all, no Zambian politician during this period openly suggested weakening wildlife laws, despite such a move's potential popularity with the electorate. But, this chapter has demonstrated that Kaunda's new authority also had limits, which al-

lowed parliamentarians to oppose bills that augmented poaching penalties and UNIP officials to make cuts in the NPWS budget and sabotage new conservation agencies. Additionally, no government officials made any attempt to inform magistrates of the new provisions of Act 32 of 1982; the future director of the wildlife department was fined for contempt of court when he criticized a magistrate over the small fines meted out to a person caught with two rhino horns.<sup>156</sup>

The evidence presented in this chapter calls into question many commonly held assumptions about the politics of one-party states in Africa. Scholars have indicated that in African one-party states parliaments were composed of members with few ties to the electorate, offering scant opposition to government policy.<sup>157</sup> Most observers tend either to ignore the role of elections under one-party rule, or, when they are mentioned, to characterize them as vehicles to ensure centralized party control over political recruitment.<sup>158</sup> Further, researchers assert that dominant one-party presidents and their advisers easily manipulate constitutional provisions and government policy.<sup>159</sup>

This chapter has presented evidence that parliaments in a one-party state can be relatively independent of the executive on certain issues. Parliamentarians can be strong representatives of their constituents and be motivated by electoral competition even when such action challenges the preferred policy position of a one-party president. The case of the 1982 amendment revealed that parliamentarians under Zambia's one-party state succeeded in modifying a president's policy position.

Four characteristics of wildlife policy facilitated the Zambian parliament's opposition. First, the effects of wildlife policy were widespread. Most of Zambia's electoral constituencies contained or abutted a game management area or national park. Those constituencies that did not, usually urban areas, still included Zambians interested in wildlife as a business or supply of meat. Second, the evidence suggests parliamentarians viewed wildlife as an electoral issue. Although certain economic policies pursued by the government may have more seriously damaged the livelihood of the average rural resident, such laws were difficult to understand. In contrast, villagers knew precisely the cause of their exclusion from wildlife resources and continually sought greater legal access. Pressuring parliamentarians and poaching emerged as two of their strategies to obtain such access. Third, the benefits politicians received from preventing greater enforcement of wildlife conservation accrued to them individually, obviating the need for collective action. Policies that required group solidarity would be more vulnerable to a breakdown in support. Monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms would need to be constructed and maintained. And such a group would also be an easier target for a one-party president. Finally, parliamentarians could oppose

### *The National Politics of Wildlife Policy*

President Kaunda's policy preferences by doing nothing; rather than expose themselves politically by advocating policy change, they could hide behind supporting the status quo, which was, in effect, Kaunda's old policy. These four characteristics of wildlife policy allowed a so-called rubber-stamp parliament to foil a one-party president's goals.

This chapter has also demonstrated that the case of Kenya presents some striking similarities to that of Zambia. Political institutions and economic decline fueled a widespread illegal wildlife market. Without a President Kaunda to impose any limits, Kenya's politicians and officials – hungry for patronage resources – obtained any benefits they could from the increasing value of wildlife products. Parliamentarians neither had to introduce legislation to help their constituents gain wildlife's benefits, nor to battle a conservation-minded president in order to reap political reward. On the contrary, one reason the "poaching equilibrium" was so stable was that politicians did not have to do anything to gain economic and political advantage.

Zimbabwe's experiences were quite different from Kenya's and Zambia's. Not confronting severe economic contraction, and not possessing the type of patronage politics found in well-entrenched one-party systems, Zimbabwe did not endure poaching to the same extent. Aside from large losses to its rhino populations – which most observers attribute to cross-border hunting by Zambians – Zimbabwe's wildlife populations remained relatively intact. Nevertheless, as in Zambia the structure of Zimbabwe's post-1985 electoral system offered incentives to parliamentarians to question the augmentation of wildlife enforcement.

While exploring the politics of wildlife policy in Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, this chapter has emphasized deeper issues of institutional creation and change. It has shown that alterations to the institutional arena had significant effects on the distribution of resources and, consequently, policy outcomes. Zambia and Kenya each endured serious economic decline at the same time that the international demand for wildlife products was increasing. These external shocks, combined with the political institutions of the one-party states in Zambia and Kenya, which emphasized the distribution of patronage resources, resulted in a dramatic increase in the illegal hunting and marketing of wildlife. Poor conservation results motivated Kaunda to try to modify wildlife policy. But the shift in resource endowment and institutional incentives motivated other Zambian political actors to maintain status quo institutions, despite the economic and biological losses due to rampant poaching in the country. Presidents Kenyatta and Moi of Kenya did not make serious efforts to disturb the political equilibrium of poaching until external forces threatened to disrupt their extremely important tourism market. Zimbabwe was characterized by different political and economic fea-

### *Poaching in One-Party States*

tures, which resulted in lower levels of illegal wildlife use. Conservationists frequently claim that wildlife staff in Zimbabwe were "just less corrupt" than their colleagues in Zambia and Kenya; this chapter has explored the institutional reasons for such behavior.

In the 1980s, the poaching crisis in parts of Africa generated some consensus among African wildlife managers, donors, and nongovernmental organizations that local communities should be more involved in the management and benefits of wildlife conservation. Groups in Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe all espoused this new decentralized approach. Part II explores how national bureaucracies in these three countries contended with this new policy emphasis. Political institutions provided constraints to the choices of wildlife managers and help to account for the content and outcomes of the countries' wildlife policies.

Because this government system makes protection from *domestic* sources ineffectual, groups may seek security from *international* sources for their agency. A foreign patron could alleviate political uncertainty caused by the one-party president by tying his hands through bi- or multilateral agreements about the agency's structure and mandate. Aid contracts could be written to specify the agency's mandate, hiring procedures, funding mechanisms, and decision-making processes. Monitoring mechanisms – such as review missions, required reports, financial audits, and annual meetings of the government and donor – could be included in the agreement to keep the agency protected from the president and other domestic politicians aspiring to use it for their own goals. By gaining international support, a group also succeeds in linking the president's reputation to their agency. The president's acceptance of an agreement with a donor confers some international significance on their bureaucracy. Failure to perform the actions agreed upon may damage his credibility and thus threaten his access to other forms of international aid.

Groups seek to augment and insulate their public agencies under any system of government; a one-party state forces them to consider specific mechanisms to limit the capricious inclinations of a powerful president as well.

CONSERVATIONISTS AND THE SEARCH FOR  
NEW WILDLIFE PROGRAMS IN ZAMBIA'S  
SECOND REPUBLIC

Individuals and groups interested in conserving Zambian wildlife had little success in changing policy or programs from 1973 to 1982 (see Chapter 3). President Kaunda, the National Parks and Wildlife Service, and international and local conservationists could not overcome the incentives generated by Zambia's political and economic institutions for party and government members to oppose conservation measures. The institutional environment changed, however, with an influx of ideas and financing from international sources.<sup>22</sup>

Using these new resources, two proconservation groups emerged within Zambia. Both attempted to create programs they most preferred. Both sought the resources necessary to extend their own authority over Zambia's wildlife estate. And both had to contend with the political uncertainty generated by Zambia's one-party state. Their fear of Kaunda's possible interventions drove them to choose some parallel strategies of insulation. But their strategies and resultant agency structures diverged because they possessed different levels of public authority at the outset.

*The Emergence of Two Conservation Factions*

In the late 1970s and early 1980s a researcher from the United States found that human activity such as farming, bush burning, and legal and illegal hunting significantly altered the movements and foraging habits of elephants in the Lupande Game Management Area of the Luangwa Valley.<sup>23</sup> The researcher's studies brought him into daily contact with villagers and traditional authorities. It became clear to him that rural residents paid the costs of conservation policies without receiving much benefit. The abundance and variety of wildlife in national parks and game management areas favored tourists and licensed hunters; wild animals did little to augment legally the daily living standards of the villagers.<sup>24</sup>

Motivated by his observations, and his conflicts with a local chief, the researcher, with the help of NPWS and the nongovernmental organization Save the Rhino Trust, arranged for a conference of wildlife managers, conservationists, government officials, and donors to discuss the problems regarding resource use in the Lupande Game Management Area. The Lupande Development Workshop convened on 18 September 1983 to develop strategies to combat the increasing depletion of natural resources in both the Lupande area and Zambia's other protected zones. Participants in the Lupande Development Workshop represented precisely those groups whose conservation interests had been stymied by members of the party and government in the preceding decade.<sup>25</sup>

The Lupande Development Workshop's proceedings, resolutions, and aftermath would change the face of Zambian conservation policy for the next decade. Participants agreed that Zambia needed a new program of wildlife conservation. They agreed that a project should be established to develop the Luangwa catchment area as a model for the efficient management and utilization of wildlife.<sup>26</sup> They agreed that both domestic and international funds were necessary to support the proposed research and more effective antipoaching efforts. And they agreed the project should also include "people of the Luangwa Valley GMAs [game management areas]" in the "development and management of the catchment's natural resources."<sup>27</sup>

But participants strongly disagreed over the proposed project's design. Two different factions within this proconservation lobby emerged. One group, led by Europeans from international development agencies and the Zambian conservation community, favored a large-scale program that incorporated the management of all natural resources. They argued that the contingent nature of villagers' resource use required an integrated resource development project (IRDP). Importantly, this bloc also expressed a desire for the new institution to be independent of the normal course of Zambian politics, which had stymied their attempts to

### *The Bureaucratic Politics of Wildlife Policy*

Larsen and Lungu espoused a design for LIRDП that would enhance its insulation from political intervention. They suggested the LIRDП assume authority over all land-use and resource management projects in the proposed area, including control over all aspects of wildlife management that the NPWS currently exercised, such as determining hunting quotas, controlling harvesting, distributing meat, and patrolling for poachers. The consultants thought that LIRDП administrators should also be included in the decision-making processes of all government ministry programs in the project area. Further, the consultants' report recommended that LIRDП administration gain supervisory powers over all ministry staff seconded to the project.

To enhance LIRDП's financial freedom, the consultants advocated that the project be given its own revolving fund mechanism. All revenues from project activities would be put into this fund, including game license fees, safari license fees, national park entrance fees, and revenues generated from the sale of confiscated trophies (such as ivory and rhino horn). Larsen and Lungu proposed to give the LIRDП administrators complete control of this fund, so that they could authorize necessary expenditures without having to run the gauntlet of central government agencies for permission.<sup>73</sup>

Further insulating LIRDП was Larsen and Lungu's plan to confer strong powers on LIRDП's two directors. The codirectors would be responsible only to a Steering Committee.<sup>74</sup> Although the codirectors could be advised by members of the NPWS, the University of Zambia, the Wildlife Conservation Society of Zambia, six chiefs, four chairmen of the local UNIP wards, and "other relevant agencies," the codirectors had the power to choose which activities would be funded and which individuals would staff them.<sup>75</sup>

Consequently, Larsen and Lungu's recommendations reflected both the preferences of the European conservationists' bloc and the political institutions of Zambia's one-party state. Decisions would emanate from the top of a hierarchically organized, independent government agency that was unaffiliated with the NPWS. LIRDП administration would have authority over the projects and staff of other government agencies in its area, and control their own revolving fund. And although rural residents would benefit from the program, they were still removed from any meaningful decision-making power over wildlife resources and remained subject to the exclusionary impact of Cap. 316, the provisions of which LIRDП planned to enforce more diligently.

*LIRDП's Need for Kaunda.* Lungu and the European conservationists knew their proposal for a vast new bureaucracy would not fare well if

### *Wildlife Policy and Structural Choice*

left to the normal political process. Conservation was unpopular. The government was nearly bankrupt. And extant government agencies would resent LIRDП's attempts to usurp their share of public authority. Only one Zambian politician could provide the political backing necessary to carve out the niche that LIRDП sought: President Kaunda.

Larsen and Lungu used the influence of the Eastern Province member of UNIP's Central Committee and the leverage of Larsen's affiliation with NORAD to press for a private audience with Kaunda. During their discussions, the consultants also suggested that the president assume the chairmanship of LIRDП's Steering Committee. Kaunda enthusiastically accepted.<sup>76</sup>

Kaunda had several reasons to support LIRDП. Of course, one reason was that the president was a conservationist who had been frustrated by his previous efforts. Conservationists outside Zambia had criticized his handling of the protection of Zambia's wildlife, and LIRDП might succeed in protecting animals where other measures had failed. But LIRDП served other, more political, ends as well. LIRDП would channel funds, development projects, and employment to the Eastern Province, long known as a UNIP stronghold. Further, LIRDП could deliver these benefits without generating criticism about Kaunda's playing regional favorites: After all, the Luangwa Valley area was chosen because of its spectacular wildlife, and the monies would come from international donors, not government coffers. The program's core area, the Mambwe Subdistrict, happened to be the home of Kaunda's wife's family; his son Wezi would win the area's parliamentary seat in 1988. Supporting the LIRDП allowed Kaunda to meet conservation and political goals with little cost.

LIRDП began to benefit immediately from the patronage of the most powerful politician in Zambia. Unlike most development projects under the NCDP, Larsen and Lungu used Kaunda's backing to avoid presenting their proposals for scrutiny, and LIRDП's Phase I began without NCDP review.<sup>77</sup> Kaunda intervened directly to hire LIRDП's codirectors, writing to the Malawian president, Hastings Banda, to release Dr. Richard Bell from service as a consultant to the Malawian wildlife department. Kaunda also wrote a letter to the Ministry of Finance on 7 May 1986, formally initiating LIRDП and appointing Bell and Lungu as its codirectors.<sup>78</sup> And Kaunda began personal appeals to the prime minister of Norway for funding.<sup>79</sup>

Bell and Lungu used Kaunda's backing to build an organization insulated from other government agencies. After LIRDП's official start under the supervision of the NCDP's permanent secretary, the codirectors concentrated on developing the organizational structure, work programs, and funding proposals from late 1985 to early 1986. The permanent

- animals hunted, a basic safari license fee, a standard fee for exporting trophies, and a tax on each trophy exported.
33. Significantly, NPWS did not have to rely on Kaunda or other public agencies for these changes, so neither the transfer of the concession area nor the new tax required NPWS to fight other government officials. The Minister of Tourism had the authority to declare these actions unilaterally.
  34. Under Republic of Zambia, Cap. 600 of the laws of Zambia, government agencies capable of supporting themselves had been able to apply for their own "working funds" since 1969. The government wanted such funds to allow agencies, especially those related to the mining industry, quickly to procure needed inputs from their own revenues without having to go through the Ministry of Finance. Interview with B. Nair, director of internal accounts, Ministry of Finance, Lusaka, 1 April 1991.
  35. Ibid. Mr. Nair believes that because of a lack of oversight, many of these revolving fund administrators became wealthier.
  36. Ibid. Also see Wright, "Alleviating Poverty," p. 14; A. N. Mwenya, D. M. Lewis, and G. B. Kaweche, *ADMADE: Policy, Background and Future* (Lusaka, Zambia: National Parks and Wildlife Service, 1990), p. 4, also interview with B. Nair, Lusaka, 1 April 1991. The government seeded the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund with a grant of 418,618 kwacha in 1984. LIRDP would use the WCRF to deposit its earnings until it gained its own revolving fund in 1987.
  37. Wright, "Alleviating Poverty," p. 14.
  38. Ibid., p. 15.
  39. Interview with D. Lewis, Nyamaluma Camp, Zambia, 22 July 1991.
  40. Although the local Kunda ethnic group do not prefer to eat hippo meat, it was still cropped because its products could be sold elsewhere, and the number of hippo in the area could well withstand a significant amount of off take.
  41. In 1986, NPWS collected 134,444.41 Zambian kwacha (ZK) in safari concession fees, of which the community's share was ZK 53,777.76. Using a nominal exchange rate of 7.5 kwacha to the U.S. dollar, the amounts represent approximately \$18,000 and \$7,200, respectively. See A. N. Mwenya, G. B. Kaweche, and D. M. Lewis, *Administrative Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE)* (Chilanga, Zambia: National Parks and Wildlife Service, January 1988), p. 6. The exchange rate used here is the average of the nominal figures presented for the four quarters of 1986. See Doris Jansen, *Trade Exchange Rate, and Agricultural Pricing Policies in Zambia* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1988), table 6, p. 21. Because these are nominal figures, and the kwacha was overvalued by the Zambian government, the amounts given overestimate the value of the ADMADE revenues.
  42. NPWS claims the pilot project produced over \$35,000 in gross revenues and provided twenty-one full-time and thirty-seven part-time jobs. See National Parks and Wildlife Service/Lupande Development Project (NPWS-LDP), *Zambian Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter* 1 (Nyamaluma Camp, May 1988), pp. 1-3; Mwenya et al., "Administrative Management," pp. 5-6.
  43. Mwenya, Kaweche, and Lewis, *ADMADE: Policy*, p. 4.
  44. For example, other ADMADE documents are less certain about the significance of the project to local attitudes. "Overwhelming evidence supported the conclusion that the more positive attitudes toward wildlife conservation found among residents in the Lupande Project area was [sic] at least partially due to the significant economic benefits from wildlife available to the local community" (emphasis added). See NPWS/LDP, *Zambian Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter*, p. 2.

Some individuals disputed the validity of the pilot project's claims to have significantly reduced poaching. Lewis based the rate of poaching decline on the

- decrease in the number of fresh carcasses of rhino and elephant found in the project area. Critics indict this methodology on several grounds. The incentives and skill of the village scout/NPWS patrols' counting may produce low counts. poachers could have hidden carcasses, and the use of the fresh carcass technique does not take into account baseline populations or possible animal migration.
45. The project, like many development projects, gave access to decision-making powers and material benefits to the chief and his followers. The project had no provision to include nonelites in decision-making structures.
  46. NPWS originally selected units on the criterion that their safari concession fees would cover the costs of ADMADE programs. Thus, some units' boundaries coincided with areas already marked as hunting blocks. However, most units followed established GMA borders, apparently to reduce possible administrative confusion. See NPWS/LDP, *Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter*, p. 3. However, neither the ability of areas to support safari hunting nor their potential for effective wildlife management correlates with GMA boundaries.
  47. Mwenya, Kaweche, and Lewis, *ADMADE: Policy*, p. 6.
  48. Interview with D. Lewis, Nyamaluma Camp, Zambia, 28 June 1991.
  49. Mwenya, Kaweche, and Lewis, *ADMADE: Policy*, p. 6.
  50. Interview with D. Lewis; see also NPWS/LDP, *Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter*, p. 4.
  51. Mwenya, Kaweche, and Lewis, *ADMADE: Policy*, pp. 6-7. The full terms of reference for the WMA were the following:
    - monitor both legal and illegal off-takes of wildlife resources;
    - initiate projects for improved wildlife management;
    - approve allocation of sustained-yield quotas of wildlife as recommended by NPWS for various forms of use: safari hunting, export and restocking, culling, resident hunting, etc.;
    - liaise with the Director, NPWS, on the issuance of hunting licenses;
    - ensure that 40 percent of the revenue generated from the exploitation of wildlife resources is committed to the management costs of wildlife resources within the unit;
    - ensure that 35 percent of the revenue earned is used by local village communities from whose area such revenues were generated;
    - prepare a work plan for the unit's wildlife management program and local community improvement on an annual basis;
    - enforce the National Parks and Wildlife Act, Cap. 316, and other relevant Acts through the office of that unit's unit leader;
    - furnish the Director of NPWS records of its meetings;
    - encourage applied management research and solicit outside expertise where needed;
    - act as a planning body for formulating new wildlife policies and appropriate management activities;
    - implement policy concerning wildlife management for its unit; and
    - manage self-help schemes by appointed communities.
  52. Mwenya, Kaweche, and Lewis, "Administrative Management," p. 13.
  53. NPWS/LDP, *Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter*, 6 (August 1990), p. 2.
  54. NPWS/LDP, *Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter*, 9 (September 1991), p. 1.
  55. WWF gave ADMADE \$124,000 for the purchase of two vehicles and the construction of unit headquarters for two GMAs. Additional funding was also provided by USAID and a U.S. citizen who had befriended Dale Lewis. See NPWS/LDP, *Zambian Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter*, 1 (May 1988), p. 4.
  56. Ibid. In 1988, revenue from the fourteen ADMADE units was U.S. \$391,250. Safari-hunting concession fees accounted for well over 90 percent of the total.

57. Republic of Zambia, "Project Grant Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the United States of America for Natural Resources Management," 1990, annex 1, p. 3 (mimeo).
58. Although the grant allowed for a project officer from the WWF to supervise ADMAD, NPWS had a say in the individual selected.
59. Ibid., p. 4.
60. Ibid., p. 5.
61. USAID gave \$1.1 million to ADMAD through WWF and \$1.8 million to ADMAD for capital expenditure. USAID kept \$100,000 for future evaluation of expenses and discretionary funds. The final agreement was not signed until 16 January 1990. Interview with Jim Harmon, USAID Zambia, Lusaka, 15 February 1991.
62. USAID, "Project Grant Agreement," p. 2.
63. In fact, the Zambian government agreed to make these changes *before* the disbursement of any USAID funds. See USAID, "Project Grant Agreement," p. 3.
64. Ibid., p. 4.
65. The National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) is the Zambian agency responsible for overseeing all interministerial development projects in the country.
66. Larsen, a Norwegian wildlife biologist, did not possess primary expertise in either Africa or development projects; his most well-known work concerned polar bears. To overcome his lack of knowledge, Larsen relied a great deal on the knowledge and opinions of the European conservationist community in Zambia. Although employed as a NPWS biologist, he always felt excluded from the department's inner circle of decision makers. Lungu was ambitious, knew the Zambian political environment well, and had experience working with international conservation organizations. Interviews with Mike Eaddy, Save the Rhino Trust, Lusaka, 21 March 1991; Monica Ngoma, former senior economist, Land and Natural Resource Unit, National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka, 10 October 1991; and Fidelis Lungu, former codirector LIRD, Chipata, Zambia, 28 May 1991.
67. Another NORAD consultant, Trond Vedeld, helped Larsen and Lungu from 13 June to 10 July 1985. ADMAD's Dale Lewis claims that Larsen rewrote the terms of reference to further his own vision of the Lupande area project. Interview with D. Lewis, Nyamaluma Camp, Zambia, 22 July 1991.
68. Although LIRD sought to manage the full range of natural resources, wildlife clearly remained the means and the ends of most of LIRD's proposed activities. Wildlife tourism and hunting would generate the majority of LIRD's funds, and policies to strengthen wildlife management dominated LIRD's planned activities. Thor Larsen, Fidelis B. Lungu, and Trond Vedeld, "Preparation Report on the Lupande Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRD)," Chipata, September 1985 (photocopy).
- Some NCDP and NORAD officials believed LIRD's focus on wildlife reflected the professional background of the Larsen and Lungu and cynically remarked that some of the project's activities, such as the women's program, "were merely window-dressing designed to get the sponsorship of foreign donors for a big wildlife project."
69. Interview with Arne Lomming, NORAD, Lusaka, 10 September 1991. This was Larsen's first experience with a development project. Further, had Larsen and Lungu reviewed current development literature — which normally appears in NORAD project proposals — they would have realized that experts were beginning to reject LIRDs in favor of supporting key institutions at the local level and locally sustainable projects.
70. Interview with Richard Bell, codirector LIRD, Chipata, Zambia, 28 May 1991.

71. Revealingly, most of Larsen and Lungu's discussion of NPWS in their "Preparation Report" occurs only in the context of which staff and resources the department should bequeath to the new LIRD program.
72. Larsen and Lungu advocated an approach similar to Zimbabwe's experiments with community participation in wildlife management but acknowledged that the Zimbabwean approach "can probably not be transferred directly to Zambia, for various reasons including the differences in legislation." See their "Preparation Report," p. 85.
73. Despite LIRD's goal of self-sufficiency, and its desire to expropriate all wildlife-related revenues in the project area, the consultants estimated that the project would still require \$25 million in external funds over the first five years before it became self-sufficient. See Larsen and Lungu, "Preparation Report," p. 67. In comparison, the Ministry of Health's expenditures for the entire country totaled about \$23 million in 1986.
74. At this time, Larsen and Lungu suggested that the committee's membership be "open to all organizations (Government Ministries, District Councils, Chiefs, etc.) which might be affected by the Project or have a legitimate interest in it." See their "Preparation Report," p. 61. Aside from chiefs, rural residents were not mentioned.
75. Larsen and Lungu proposed seven organizational subunits under the codirectors' authority (extension/development, operation and logistics, antipoaching, information/education, women's program, research/management, and cooperatives) but thought it best to allow the future codirectors to design the activities and structures of these subunits in more detail. Ibid., pp. 64-65.
76. Richard Bell and Fidelis Lungu tell a less political tale about Larsen and Lungu's meeting with Kaunda. They assert that during the president's annual visit to the presidential lodge in the Luangwa Valley, Kaunda had heard of the report being prepared by Larsen and Lungu and had "demanded" that they journey to his lodge to present their findings. Their ensuing discussion supposedly moved Kaunda deeply; he declared LIRD to be the "answer to my prayers" and insisted on being the chair of the Steering Committee. Interviews with Bell and Lungu, Chipata, Zambia, 28 May 1991.
- Kaunda had good reasons to be enthusiastic about Bell and Lungu's proposals. Through LIRD, Kaunda could direct a great deal of resources into an area that had long been a UNIP stronghold and that was the home of his wife's family. As a result of LIRD, Mambwe would eventually receive full district status, which would increase its political importance and government services. Finally, LIRD offered Kaunda a way to respond to the international press, which had been highly critical of Zambia's conservation efforts.
77. Interview with Gilson Kaweché, deputy director — NPWS, Chilanga, Zambia, 10 October 1991. Kaweché avers that NCDP questioned the procedures that LIRD followed.
78. Ibid. NCDP Permanent Secretary Alimankani told Chief Wildlife Research Officer Gilson Kaweché that the positions should have been advertised.
79. On 7 May 1986, President Kaunda formally initiated LIRD in a letter to the Ministry of Finance that outlined the principal features of the program, including LIRD's control of the South Luangwa National Park and Lupande Game Management Areas, responsibility for all programs concerning natural resource study and use in the project area, right to a revolving fund mechanism, and management by two codirectors. See R. H. V. Bell and F. B. Lungu, "The Luangwa Phase II," August 1986, viii-ix (mimeo).
80. The ministries were Finance; National Commission for Development Planning; Lands and Natural Resources; Tourism; Agriculture and Water Management.