however, more than 600 other candidates were nominated. While, after the dissolution of the traditional political parties, the I.R.A.A. might have been expected to enjoy a nomination monopoly, it appears that it was unable to prevent sharp competition, even though such competition did not have any organized national basis like the former political parties.

The candidates of the I.R.A.A. enjoyed the support of a broad campaign in their favor in which apparently all members of the government participated, including the military premier. Thereby the Japanese elections of April 30, 1942, were "khaki elections" in which the government tried to push its candidates by making them, through its support, the representatives of Japan's victorious military forces.

There can be little doubt that, to some degree at least, the United States' air bombing of Japan interfered with the plan to gain full and unimpaired popular support for the candidates of the I.R.A.A. However, the size of the original opposition, as expressed by the number of "free" candidates pleading for the favor of voters against the I.R.A.A. and the Imperial Government, would seem to indicate that there still exist sizable elements of a Japanese opposition. This is made more clear by the election results. Despite the tremendous moral and political support for the I.R.A.A. candidates, the dissidents won nearly 90 seats in the Lower House of the Diet, with the I.R.A.A. candidates carrying 81% of the seats.

Unfortunately our information does not allow of any detailed interpretation of the election results of April 30. However there can be little doubt that, just as five years ago, the center of dissident opinion continues to be located in Japan's cities. The cities, however, are underrepresented in the Japanese Diet, where the distribution of seats between the districts of Japan has not kept fully in step with the shift of the population from the countryside to the urban centers. The large number of opposition nominations suggests that their success in general did not indicate unanimous approval of any one candidate. For that very reason, their 19% victory reflects a stronger popular opposition than appears at first glance.

Literally nothing is known here about the differences in program which distinguished the candidates of the I.R.A.A. from the dissidents. Neither is it known how the I.R.A.A. selected its candidates. Its previous practice would suggest that the roster contained a generous sprinkling of parliamentarians who were serving in the Diet of 1937 and who owed their ultimate election not only to I.R.A.A. support but also to their previous political record.

On the other hand, quite a few of the dissidents may also have been elected because of their opposition to such candidates nominated in deference to the defunct party system rather than because of their affiliation with the I.R.A.A. itself. Yet the mere fact that the Government-sponsored nomination monopoly failed to function completely is of great interest not only to the Japanese people but also to the enemies of Imperial Japan. The election results would seem to demonstrate that Japan is far from having reached even the degree of deceptive "national unity" which other Fascist nations have managed to demonstrate in popular elections or plebiscites.

The widely-advocated interpretation of Japan as a totalitarian state is thus shown to be questionable. For the moment, of course, no serious outward rifts could be expected within Japan. On the contrary, the first session of the newly-elected Japanese Diet is likely to be a great national ceremony. But behind the to-be-expected demonstration of national unity, there exists a Japanese nation which is much less united and more worried than public utterances will indicate.

To some extent, worries are already clear in the program of the new Diet session. Its first job will be legislation and appropriations with regard to the shipping and shipbuilding program. The session is now scheduled to last only two days. If, however, foreign or domestic developments so require, the session may well be extended beyond the time limit set beforehand. Serious military setbacks, for instance, might produce such an extension. They might also produce real debates. If, even after Japan's great victories, a sizable proportion of the Diet members is not fully in accord with the government, any setbacks now are likely to be reflected in outspoken criticism.

K. B.

Frontier Tribes of Southwest China

By HSIEN-CHIN HU

THE JAPANESE have pushed the British and Chinese back into a part of the world which is ill fitted to become one of the battlegrounds on which the fate of democracy is to be decided. The northern part of Burma and the southwest frontiers of China contain a mixture of peoples of such cultural diversity and backwardness that it is difficult to guess what can be hoped for in the way of assistance to the cause of the United Nations.

These peoples have rarely been pulled together under one political power; during most of their recent history, they have been subject on one side of the

border to British and on the other side of the border to Chinese rule. Torn apart by geography and divided by a multitude of culture patterns, the tribes of the southwest which constitute over half the population of Yunnan province have never played an historical role rivalling that of China's neighbors to the north. They have been the buffer between China and India, the sort of frontier that should bring joy to the disciples of Haushofer.

The peoples of southwest China have played an important part in the war. They contributed many of the workers, male and female, who built the Burma Road, and the casualties they suffered on that project were high enough to give them a place on the honor roll of China's war heroes. The strategic and economic importance of this region makes their cooperation in the war effort an end of policy. The war gave impetus to a study of the peoples of the southwest; Chinese anthropologists and geographers such as Ting Wen-chiang, Wu Wen-tsao, Fei Hsiao-tung and others have turned to this area in recent years.

Chinese Influence

The Chinese, who have not always been very gentle in dealing with the aborigines, have often had to fight their way southwards, for the Chinese have come historically not so much to colonialize as to colonize. With those groups who accepted Chinese rule, a certain amount of assimilation has taken place and intermarriage has brought about a mixture of Chinese and native customs. Under the imperial régime, young people from these partly civilized groups were accepted for the civil service examinations, just as today all groups are encouraged to send their children to Chinese schools. However, during recent times Chinese economic and social changes have been taking place mainly on the coast, and this region in the far interior has been sadly neglected, with the result that administrative abuses have become all too frequent.

French missionaries who reported to their government the unrest against Chinese rule in this area were probably guilty of wishful thinking, yet they drew a picture with much truth in it. Under the old Chinese administration, landlords, merchants and administrators had little interest in the native population except as it contributed to their own profit.

Investigators and travelers sent by the government to study the situation suggested reforms some of which have been acted upon. Chinese magistrates have been instructed to take to heart native aboriginal as well as Chinese interests in that part of the world. Measures have been taken to restrain Chinese from the acquisition of landed property to the detriment of the natives; schools have been opened under Chinese supervision; and some effort has been made to bring these peoples into contact with the modern world.

The political question of the day is to what extent the reforms in administration effected by the present rulers of China have been successful in securing the political allegiance of the peoples of the southwest frontier. Of the tribes of northern Burma, only two, the Kachins and the Chins, supported the British. (These were the Kachins who had fought in Mesopotamia in the last war.) How many of the tribes of the southwest will fight for China, and what would be their contribution?

Northern Burma, culturally speaking, forms a unit with Yunnan. Along the rugged mountains and in the innumerable valleys of this area have collected peoples of the utmost diversity in language and custom. In the more fertile valleys of Yunnan where they rub elbows with the Chinese, from whom some of these groups have taken many cultural features, they supply their neighbors with the products of the mountain and the forest, such as jade and medicinal herbs.

But who are the people living in this remote corner of the world? What is their relation to each other and to the present conflict? If language, comparatively the most stable element of human culture, be taken as the best criterion for classification, the picture is one of great linguistic diversity, reflecting population movements as old as history. Three families of languages can be distinguished.

Languages of the Region

First is the Mon-Khmer group, spoken by some widely scattered aboriginal tribes in India, southern Indo-China, and by various small units in the mountains of southwest China and Indo-China. In Yunnan and northern Burma, there are a few small groups speaking a pure Mon-Khmer language, but the vocabulary of many other tribes also shows an admixture of Mon-Khmer words.

The Shan language is spoken in the Shan states of northern Burma as well as by the P'o and related tribes in western Yunnan. This linguistic group is closely affiliated with the language of the Thai in Thailand. Related to it are also the two aboriginal groups, the Miao in Kweichow and the Yao in Kwangsi, some communities of which have wandered off into Yunnan.

The Tibeto-Burman group links the inhabitants of Burma and many of the aboriginal tribes in Yunnan and Tibet. Thus the Nosu (or Lolo) in northern Yunnan and southern Szechwan belong here, as do also the Kachin tribes across the border in Burma, who have been fighting by the side of the British against the Japanese.

Economically, the level of these people is not very high. The form of agriculture practiced by the mountain tribes is the so-called slash-and-burn type. Fertilizer is secured by felling trees on a chosen spot

where they are burned; no other fertilizer is used except the ashes. Because of ignorance of the use of manure, the soil around the village is rapidly exhausted and the village has to be moved every five or ten years —an important contrast with China.

The women who worked on the Burma Road when at home take care of the sowing, reaping and harvesting of crops, although the heavy work is done everywhere by men. Of the crops, buckwheat and maize, millet and dry rice are the most important. Dry rice is grown extensively in all southeastern Asia where irrigation is not possible. This diet is supplemented by the collection of roots and fruits or by hunting and fishing. There is not, therefore, much in the way of food stores for the invader or for the Chinese to draw upon.

There are some domestic animals, but they are used mainly as gifts, for sacrifices and sometimes for payment of fines. This means that meat is eaten only when some special occasion like a marriage or a funeral calls for sacrifices and a feast. Even fowl and eggs are used mainly for divination, for example, to determine a suitable spot for burial ground. This is not a country, therefore, upon which an army can easily live.

Village Politics

Political organization is decentralized, the unit being the village. Here the headman, who monopolizes prestige and owns more animals than the rest of the village, who entertains strangers and deals with passing officials, is the hereditary official. It is he who adjudicates quarrels and crimes in the village and deals with the feuds which occasionally break out between the more important families. As he is not exempt from working for his livelihood, and as his authority is held in check by the other older members of his community, the village headman is not an unfettered autocrat—his authority depends partly on his character.

There is hardly anything of a money economy; domestic animals and in some cases slaves are the medium for compounding differences. When the government demands men for public labor, such as the building of the Burma Road, it is the headman who is made responsible for its provision.

The villages remain more or less independent of each other. In some areas, a village chief has become strong enough to bring several villages together and keep them at peace with each other. On the whole, however—and this is of considerable importance today —each village considers itself an autonomous political unit with no ties to any other village, and will wage war on its neighbors at the slightest provocation. A wrong, whether perpetrated by somebody in a neighboring village or by a Chinese, is never forgotten. Sooner or later a raid on the village of the criminal will avenge the deed. Captives are taken and brought back as house slaves. In the building of the Burma Road, the Chinese Government used the spirit of competition between the villages to good advantage.

Some of the tribes that have developed a strong political system, such as the Nosu, have whole villages of Chinese or other tribes under their power, who are forced to serve them with the products of their labor. Taxes levied on such a village are collected by them from their subject peoples. This situation may perhaps be traced back to the feudal Shan kingdom at Tali, which flourished between the seventh and tenth centuries.

There is no way in which the Chinese can unite these peoples in terms of religion. Religion revolves mainly around the evil spirits who inhabit all of nature, rocks, rivers, winds and forests, and try to harm man whenever they can. To them nearly all diseases are attributed. The priest or *shamen* decides which spirit has caused the disease and what sacrifice it demands. Those who can control the *shamens* can control the people. The Shans in Burma, who have nearly all accepted Buddhism, have by no means given up the worship of evil spirits. Japan's patronage of a pan-Buddhist movement may bring some rewards in Burma.

Means of intellectual communication are not very highly developed. Some of the Miao groups use a simple ideographic script; that of the Nosu is more complicated and approaches a phonetic form. The Shans in Burma have a script obviously modeled on the Sanskrit of Buddhist scriptures, which they have been studying for many generations; but they still use notched sticks as mnemonic devices. On the whole, the problem of extending propaganda to these peoples is one of enormous difficulty.

The Nosu

There are two tribes of interest to us at the present time because of their closeness to the theater of war. The Nosu inhabit northern Yunnan and southern Szechwan, their stronghold being in the wild region of Chian-ch'ang at the bend of the Yangtze river. They have been commonly called the Lolo, but they resent this name which is often used in a derogatory sense, as the Chinese character includes the dog radical. They prefer the name Nosu or "black bones." Their territory is divided among a number of chiefs. In Chinese-controlled areas, they have constituted themselves as a kind of feudal caste in many of the large cities, particularly in northern Yunnan. They make themselves felt in the Chinese administration; an increasing number of their youth is studying at Chinese schools and universities. The governor of the province of Yunnan, Lung Yun, himself belongs to one of the foremost families among the Nosu.

The anthropologist distinguishes between the fami-

lies which call themselves the "black bones," who are the real rulers, and the "white bones" or commoners, who render personal service and provide food. The picture is somewhat confused for in certain areas of western Yunnan there are communities which consist entirely of "white bones"; in other areas many of the commoners are descendants of Chinese captives who have been forced to become Nosu in custom, dress and speech. Whereas other tribes are gradually being absorbed into Chinese society by way of the lowest strata, the Nosu have more often made for themselves a position in the bureaucracy and are being assimilated through the ruling stratum.

The Nosu have expressed their support of the Chinese Government in this war, but no one can speak for the whole group in their reactions when the crisis becomes acute. They are important not for their numbers alone but also for their fine physique. They produce but do not consume opium. If they could be organized into one fighting unit against the Japanese, they would make some of the world's best guerrilla fighters. It is only their internal feuds which have so far prevented them from playing a decisive role in southwest China. We can only hope that under the impact of Japan they will come together to assist the Chinese armies.

The Kachins

The other tribal group that has come into the news these days is the Kachin tribes on the Burma-China frontier. During the days of heaviest fighting against the Japanese, they were mentioned time and again as fighting by the side of the British. In fact, except for the Chins from the hills of Assam, they are the only native tribe so mentioned.

Living in the most inaccessible parts of these wild mountains, the Kachins eke out a precarious existence. The Kachin chiefs try to conquer as many villages of their own stock and of other groups as possible, and make their living by levying tribute for their military protection. In this way they have controlled the jade and ruby mines in northern Burma. They have exacted toll from traders carrying amber and other goods along the road from Burma to China. Although their power has been to some extent checked by the British, their young men keep themselves in fighting trim by frequent raids on other villages or neighboring tribes. In other words, they are a fighting people.

Kachin mythology should appeal to the Japanese, for it justifies their desire—which is considerable—for the riches of other men by the theory that the Kachins were unjustly dealt with when the gods distributed knowledge and riches and are therefore entitled to enrich themselves at the expense of others. Nor is their social theory so far from that of Japan. The chiefs who form a feudal caste intermarry only among their own groups. Their position is buttressed by their religion, which they naturally control, and which ascribes to the nobles an origin differing from that of the commoners.

The Kachins in other words are a class society in which the ruling groups keep the rest of the population in control through a rigid social organization and an elaborately worked-out body of myth. Their mythology, for example, about the beginning of the world is among the most involved that we know. The effect is to keep the native in continual fear of evil forces which demand tribute from him; on this is based the power and wealth of the priesthood.

The Pai-i and the Min-chia

There are other smaller groups of aboriginal peoples living near the Burma Road, such as the Pai-i. They live under native chiefs to whom they pay taxes. Their women cultivate the fields, conduct most of the trade, and answer the call for labor service when it is made. Many of their women worked on the Burma Road. There has been some intermarriage with the Chinese. In some communities polygamy is the rule, for the wealth of a man depends upon the number of wives he possesses.

Another distinctive tribe are the Min-chia, in northwestern Yunnan. They are found mainly between Tali and Yung-ch'ang, that is, on the western part of the Road. They claim to be descended from Chinese soldiers who captured the Emperor Chien-wo of the Ming dynasty after he had been driven from his capital at Nanking in 1493. They not only speak Chinese with a Nanking accent, but many read and write it. They sent scholars to sit for the civil examinations in imperial days. They are not isolated; many of them reside in the larger cities where they practice the arts and crafts with considerable skill. In spite of their close association with the Chinese, they are far from Sinified. They have evolved a stable culture of Chinese and Shan elements. Neither of these groups, however, presents a serious political problem in the present conflict.

This is the area and these are the people now witnessing the struggle to decide whether China shall be shut off from the world along its southwestern frontiers. It is an area which has known very little political cohesiveness since the seventh century, when the great Shan kingdom was established in northwestern Yunnan with a capital at Tali. It is an area which has included among its exports, according to Chinese records, silks and brocades of high quality, gold, silver, tin, iron, lead, jade, amber, peacocks, rhinoceros hides, ivory and elephants. From this area trade has flowed towards China and also towards India. Through this area India received Chinese goods as early as the first century B.C.

But if the first strong cultural influence came from

India—for one story has it that the founder of the consolidated kingdom at Tali was a direct descendant of King Asoka of India—the most recent influence has been Chinese. It was not until the Mongol dynasty of the thirteenth century, however, that western Yunnan was finally incorporated into the Chinese Empire. Since that time, and especially since the British conquest of India, there has been little pressure from the Indian side.

A Soft Spot in the Chinese Front

We cannot expect, therefore, the tribes of southwest China to have any great positive effect upon the outcome of the present struggle. If they do not resent Chinese rule enough to support the Japanese, as did some of the anti-British groups in Burma, still they may be of little assistance to the Chinese, except as labor gangs. Even if we date the more enlightened Chinese policies from 1928, the means of intellectual communication among these peoples is so low that with the best will in the world it would be impossible to overcome their cultural backwardness, linguistic differentiation, and internal feuds. If they do not produce enough food to help the invader, neither do they make any easier the task of the defender. Their fate will be decided for them.

Japan has struck at a frontier where it is difficult to organize the sort of popular resistance and guerrilla warfare which arose so rapidly in northern and central China and to this very day grows in strength and effectiveness. The southwestern frontier of China, politically speaking, is the softest spot of the Chinese people's front against the Japanese. This does not mean that the Japanese will not be stopped, but it does mean that China will find her lines of communication to the Burma frontier, not so difficult or hazardous as those of the Japanese, but not so rich in popular support as those in the north.

However, once the Japanese have been defeated and China is ready to reconstruct her economy along modern lines, we shall find that her people have learned to take a different view of these hardy mountain folk. For China will not only accept these tribes with all their strange ways, but will give them their place in the brotherhood of nationalities within the borders of China.

NEW BOOKS ON THE PACIFIC AREA

AMERICA IN THE NEW PACIFIC. By George E. Taylor. Issued under the auspices of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc. New York: Macmillan, 1942. $1.75.

America's role in the new Pacific, Mr. Taylor believes, is to liberate and modernize the peoples of Asia. America, representing democracy and free competition, is fighting for the leadership of Asia against Japan, representing authoritarianism and monopoly. In the future, America must alter its techniques—uncontrolled competition must be modified in the direction of democratically controlled planning—but not its objective. Asia can fit into the American system by developing its own potential resources, both economic and political; it can fit into the Japanese system only by yielding to complete domination and exploitation by the monopoly state.

If America is to fulfill its historic role in the Pacific—if, indeed, it is to win the war—it must comprehend the make-up of both its allies and its enemies. In brief and stimulating fashion, Mr. Taylor analyzes the historical origins of the present war in the Pacific, and the diverse and sometimes conflicting interests engaged on both sides—in Japan, in China, and in colonial Asia. In discussing the policies of the United States in the Pacific, he occasionally steps from the role of historical analyst into that of prophet, in the biblical sense. But the historian turned prophet is a more trustworthy guide than his Axis counterpart, the prophet turned historian.

PROGRESS AND WELFARE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By J. S. Furnivall. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941. 75¢.

INDUSTRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Jack Shepherd. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941. 75¢.

Both these books form part of the new IPR series, *A Survey of Southeast Asia.* Dr. Furnivall's short appraisal of Western colonial experience in Southeast Asia is stimulating although controversial, as any such generalizing attempt must necessarily be. It requires—and will repay—careful reading, since Furnivall tends to shape a terminology of his own. In view of the present Japanese sweep of the Pacific colonies, it is surprising how little attention even such a thoughtful observer and critic devotes to the problem of "defense against aggression," (p. 78) which now seems to emerge as the one great test which Western colonial rule, as well as so-called Thai nationalism, has failed to pass.

Jack Shepherd's study of industrialization adds to the literature of the subject a handy short compilation. Its usefulness is somewhat impaired by his failure to correlate the industrial developments in the several countries studied. The introduction tends to indulge in generalizations which are not sufficiently substantiated, and the conclusion is somewhat colorless. The close relationship between the problem of industrialization and that of national defense is overlooked.

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FORTNIGHTLY RESEARCH SERVICE PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC., 129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION $5.00; SINGLE COPIES, 25 CENTS.

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