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| Location: |
World |
| Subject: |
Trade |
| Species: |
All Rhino Species |
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By late 1970s, CITES had started to become operational, with all rhinos listed on Appendix I. Initially, the trade ban was a dismal failure. Rhino horn prices soared on all markets, especially in the Far East. Black market trading continued unabated, and most of Africa's rhino populations were decimated by poachers. By the early 1990s, poaching levels had dropped (Martin and Vigne, 1997), and numbers have subsequently stabilised, with surviving populations confined to a few Range States and highly protected situations. Consistent with its past practices, South Africa has proposed investigating a managed legal rhino horn trade as a possible conservation measure, but this proposal has met with stiff opposition. There is a belief that the rhino horn ban is finally working. Now that most consumer states have joined CITES and outlawed domestic use of rhino hem, and now that poaching levels have dropped to sustainable levels, the problem seems to have abated. There is a fear that re-opening a legal trade will once again endanger surviving populations.
Achievements of the Trade Ban
The sudden surge in demand for rhino horn in the early 1970s will have caused some price increases in Asian markets, but because Yerneni jambiyya handle carvers re-sold off-cuts and shavings, the supply to the medicine markets was not under serious threat. However, it is likely that the CITES ban created a perceived supply shortage, which in turn led to the dramatic rise in prices in the late 1970s. Asian traders and traditional doctors, fearing thattheir supplies of hem were now under threat, probably stockpiled in anticipation of future shortages, placing considerable upward short-term pressure on prices. Rapidly rising prices led to further speculation, and subsequent undercover investigations have revealed at least two cases of large-scale illegal stockpiling (one in China and one in the UK). Markets tend to overreact to bad news, and this overreaction is exacerbated in black markets, where prices fail to reflect accurate information about a product's scarcity. It appears that speculators overestimated the demand for rhino horn, and found themselves stranded with stockpiles that they could not sell. The black market price for rhino horn subsequently dropped.
Apart from this probable 'overshooting' of black market prices, two other factors contributed to a decline in rhino poaching in the 1990s. The first was the outbreak of civil war in Yemen, which had a significant negative effect on the country's economy, and suppressed levels of consumer demand. The second was the fact that virtually no unprotected rhino populations remained. Most surviving rhinos are now well protected in areas under surveillance by armed field staff. A few remain in remote and inaccessible areas, but all the 'easy pickings' are gone.
It is thus possible that the rhino horn trade ban created a perception of enhanced scarcity, which led to the unnecessary death of many rhinos, and that the market continues to digest the glut of horn that was poached during the late 1970s and 1980s. The incentive to poach rhinos is currently low, because there are still ample stockpiles of horn on the black market. However there is evidence of ongoing consumption and demand. Does this pose any potential future threat, and if so, what should be done to address this?
Should the trade ban remain?
If the alternative theory of the ban's effects is correct, rhinos will enjoy a period of respite as long as the consumer market continues to digest existing stockpiles. However, if consumer demand persists (or increases) and stockpiles become depleted, rhinos could face another serious onslaught of poaching. Establishing a managed legal market would enable conservationists to monitor market trends. The present situation has everyone guessing.
It is wrong to assume that establishing a legal market is risky. It may in fact be riskier to leave the rhino horn trade solely in the hands of illegal operators. Establishing a legal market could provide a further advantage: a substantial source of revenue for conservation agencies. Even more so than with ivory, the potential to fund field protection with the proceeds from legal rhino horn sales is considerable, and could be of great benefit to conservation generally. Conversely, if poaching pressure increases, and conservation budgets continue to shrink, the outlook for rhino protection is bleak.
Conclusion
The rhino horn trade ban appears to be succesful at present, but probably exacerbated the poaching problem in the past. If demand for rhino products persists, the ban may again prove counterproductive in future if existing stockpiles become depleted through consumption. It is still worth considering the opetion of managed legal trade.
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Elephants, rhinos and the economics of illegal trade
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